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ABSTRACT
Recently, empirical industrial organization economists have proposed estimators for dynamic games
of incomplete information. In these models, agents choose from a finite number actions and
maximize expected discounted utility in a Markov perfect equilibrium. Previous econometric
methods estimate the probability distribution of agents’ actions in a first stage. In a second step, a
finite vector of parameters of the period return function are estimated. In this paper, we develop
semiparametric  estimators  for  dynamic  games  allowing  for  continuous  state  variables  and  a
nonparametric first stage. The estimates of the structural parameters are T
1/2 consistent (where T is
the  sample  size)  and  asymptotically  normal  even  though  the  first  stage  is  estimated











In economic theory it is common place, if not standard, to model market equilibrium as a game. Game
theory has profoundly inuenced how economic theorists conceptualize markets and regularly inuences
policy debates. By comparison, the impact of game theory on most applied ﬁelds in economics has been
much less signiﬁcant. While there is a large empirical literature that tests the predictions of certain games,
there is by comparison much less work that formally models the relationship between endogenous and ex­
ogenous variables in light of game theory. Rigorously understanding the econometric implications of game
theory is clearly a necessary condition for coherence between theoretical and empirical work in economics.
Over the past decade, structural estimation of game theoretic models has been a topic of active research
within the subﬁeld of empirical industrial organization. See Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry, and Pakes (2005)
for an excellent survey. In particular, researchers have recently proposed two­step estimation methods for
dynamic games. Like the models surveyed in Rust (1994) or studied in Keane and Wolpin (1997), agents
choose from a ﬁnite set of actions and utility at a particular point in time is a function of covariates and sto­
chastic preference shocks. Agents are forward looking and maximize expected discounted utility. How­
ever, unlike Rust, agents interact strategically and play a Markov perfect equilibrium to a dynamic game.
See Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2003), Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002), Pesendorfer and Schmidt­Dengler
(2003) and Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2003). Substantive applications of dynamic games estimators in­
clude Jenkins, Liu, McFadden, and Matzkin (2004) to the browser war and Ryan (2005) to regulation in a
concentrated industry. The problem of equilibrium existence is also considered in Jenkins et. al. (2004) as
well.
Like Hotz and Miller (1993) or Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000), estimation in these models essen­
tially takes place in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, the economist exibly estimates agents’ reduced form pol­
icy functions. In many cases, this involves estimating the probability that each of the ﬁnite set of actions is
played conditional on a ﬁnite vector of state variables. In the second step, the structural parameters of the
model are estimated. Typically, these are a ﬁnite vector that parameterize the period utility as a function
of actions and states. These estimators are attractive for applied work since they impose a relatively low
computational burden and are straightforward to program.
The formal econometric arguments used in these papers are based standard methods for the analysis
of parametric models. Such methods are appropriate for problems where (i) there are a ﬁnite number of
discrete state variables or (ii) there are continuous state variables but the parametric ﬁrst stage is correctly
2speciﬁed. However, the econometric theory has not been worked out for the case of a nonparametric ﬁrst
stage and continuous state variables. This case is important since many problems have state variables that
are naturally modeled as continuous. For instance, the state variable in models of strategic ﬁrm entry/exit
usually includes productivity which the literature usually models as continuous.
One could of course ignore the fact that the state variables are continuous and discretize the state space.
However, increasing the number of grids in estimating the ﬁrst stage choice probabilities has two offsetting
effects. It reduces the bias in the ﬁrst stage estimation but on the other hand increases the variance. When
the dimension of the continuous state variables is larger than four, it is impossible to obtain
√
T consistent
(where T is the sample size) and asymptotically normal estimators for the second stage parameters through
discretization. It can be shown that the variance of the discretization procedure is of the magnitude of
1/
√
Th d where d is the dimension of the continuous state variables and h is the window size used in the




T consistency of the parameter
estimator requires than both the variance and the bias decrease to zero as the sample size increases to ∞.I t
can easily be shown that this is impossible, however, when d is larger than 4.
In this paper, we consider the problem of semiparametric estimation of a dynamic game of incomplete
information similar to models discussed by Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2003), Aguirregabiria and Mira
(2002), Pesendorfer and Schmidt­Dengler (2003) and Bajari, Benkardand Levin(2003). Asin these earlier
papers, the goal of estimation is the recovery of a ﬁnite number of parameters in the players’ period utility
functions. Estimation takes place in four steps and, like the earlier literature imposes a fairly low com­
putational burden. In the ﬁrst step, the econometrician uses sieve methods to nonparametrically estimate
choice probabilities as a function of the state variables. (See Ai and Chen (2003) and Chen (2005)). In
the second step, using standard formulas that relate choice probabilities to choice­speciﬁc value functions,
the econometrician recovers an estimate of the choice­speciﬁc value function. (See Hotz and Miller (1993)
and Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002)). In the third step, the econometrician generates choice­speciﬁcv a l u e
functions consistent with a guess about the parameters of the period utility function. In the ﬁnal step, the
econometrician minimizes the distance between the choice­speciﬁc value functions derived in the second
and third steps.
While the construction of our estimator is in many ways inspired by insights from the earlier literature,
our approach to establishing the asymptotic properties of the estimator is quite distinct. Building on the
analysis of Newey (1994), we prove that our estimators are
√
T consistent and asymptotically normal even
if the ﬁrst stage is estimated nonparametrically. For expositional simplicity, we consider the case of period
3utility functions that are linear in the parameters as in Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2003). However, we
demonstrate in the last section that our methods can be generalized to models that do not impose this
assumption.
Finally, we consider the problem of identiﬁcation. Nonparametric identiﬁcation results for dynamic dis­
crete games are developed byAguirregabiria and Mira (2002) andPesendorfer and Schmidt­Dengler (2003)
in the context of discrete state space models. Recent works by Heckman and Navarro (2005) and Aguir­
regabiria (2005) present identiﬁcation results for dynamic discrete choice models allowing for continuous
state variables. In general, the classof modelswe study is not identiﬁed for general period return functions.
We follow Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2004) and Bajari and Krainer (2004), we demonstrate that if appropriate
exclusion restrictions are made on payoffs identiﬁcation is possible under fairly weak assumptions about
the nature of payoffs.
2 The Model.
The model is an inﬁnitely repeated game of incomplete information. We restrict attention to stationary
environments and Markov perfect equilibrium.2 In the model, there are a ﬁnite number of players i =
1,...,nand an inﬁnite number of discrete time periods T =1 ,...,∞. During each time period, players
simultaneously choose an action ai ∈ {0,1,...,K} out of a ﬁnite set. We restrict players to have the same
set of actions for notational simplicity. However, all of our results will generalize to the case where all
players have different ﬁnite sets of actions. Let A = {0,1,...,K}n denote the vector of possible actions
for all players and let a =( a1,...,a n) denote a generic element of A. A si sc o m m o ni nt h el i t e r a t u r e ,
we shall let a−i =( a1,...a i−1,a i+1,...,a n) denote a vector of strategies for all players excluding player i.
There are no mixed strategies since with probability one players will have a unique best response.
Let si ∈ Si denote the state variable for player i which is common knowledge to all players in the game.
The state variable is assumed to be a real valued vector, but unlike most of the previous literature, Si is not
r e q u i r e dt ob eaﬁnite set. Let S = ΠiSi and let s =( s1,...,s n) ∈ S denote a vector of state variables
for all n players. For each agent, there are also K +1state variables which we label as ²i(ai) which are
private information. These state variables are distributed i.i.d. across time periods, agents and actions. Let
²i denote the 1×(K +1 )vector of the individual ²i(ai). The density of ²i(ai) will be denoted as f(²i(ai)),
however, we shall sometimes abuse notation and denote the density for εi =( εi(0),...,εi(K)) as f(²i).
Let g(s0|s,a) denote the density for the realization of next periods state, s0, conditional on the current state,
2 Certain aspects of the notation will follow Rust (1994) and Pesendorfer and Schmidt­Dengler (2003).
4s, and the vector of actions, a.
The period utility function for player i is:
ui(a,s,²i;θ)=Πi(ai,a −i,s;θ)+²i(ai). (1)
The utility (1) is identical to commonly used discrete choice models such as the multinomial logit. Player
i’s utility is the sum of two terms. The ﬁrst term, Πi(ai,a −i,s;θ) is a deterministic function of the players’
actions a =( ai,a −i), the state, s =( s1,...,sn) which depends on the parameters θ. In the previous
literature, Πi(ai,a −i,s;θ) has been a parameterized as a linear combination of the actions and states. The
second term, ²i(ai),isi’sprivate informationwhichiscommonlyinterpretedasanunobservedstatevariable
(see Rust (1994)). In many applications, this will be drawn from an extreme value distribution as in the
logit model.
In what follows, we shall assume that Πi(a,st;θ) is a linear function of θ. Suppose that the “determin­
istic” part of utility takes the form:
Πi(a,st;θ)=Φi(ai,a −i,s)0θ (2)
where Φi(ai,a−i,s)=( µ1(ai,a −i,s),...,µ l(ai,a −i,s)) is a collection of l basis functions and Πi(a,st;θ)
is formed as the linear combination of this basis. This assumption may initially seem quite restrictive. We
shall impose this restriction for three reasons. The ﬁrst is that this will generate a considerable savings in
terms of both our notation. The second is that in almost all related applications in the literature payoffs
are assumed to be linear. Indeed, if the set of basis functions is sufﬁciently rich, (2) can approximate a
continuous utility function arbitrarily well. We invoke the linearity assumption primarily to simplify the
exposition of the estimator. In Section 5, we formally discuss extensions of the estimator to the case where
utility is nonlinear in θ.
Player i’s decision rule is a function ai = δi(s,²i). Note that the decision rule is not indexed by time
because of the Markovian assumption. Also, i’s decision does not depend on ²−i, since these shocks are




In the above expression, 1{δi(s,²i)=k} isthe indicator function thatplayer´ ı’s actionis k given the vector
of state variable (s,²i). Therefore, σi(ai = k|s) is the distribution of i’s actions conditional on the state
variables that are public information. We will deﬁne the distribution of a given s as σ(a|s)=Πn
i=1σ(ai|s).






In (4), πi(ai,s,² i;θ) is player i’s expect utility from choosing ai when the vector of parameters is θ.S i n c e
i does not know the private information shocks, ²j for the other players, his beliefs about their actions are
given by σ−i(a−i|s).
Players maximize expected discounted utility using the discount factor β. Given a state s and private

















The optimal choice of ai depends on the expected period utility, πi(ai,s,² i;θ) plus the discounted contin­
uation value. Note that the term
P
a−i g(s0|s,ai,a −i)σ−i(a−i|s) is the density for the state variable in the
next period given that player i chooses the action ai today.
Deﬁnition: A Markov Perfect Equilibrium is a collection of decision rules δi(s,²i), i =1 ,...,nsuch
that for all i,a l ls and all ²i, δi(s,²i) maximizes Wi(s,²i;σi,σ−i) where σ−i(a−i|s) is given by (3)
and (5).
2.1 Expected and Choice­Speciﬁc Value Functions.
Following Rust (1994), we will next deﬁne the expected and choice­speciﬁc value functions. The expected



















k is chosen,s)σi(ai = k|s), is the expected value of the error term conditional on the chosen action ai = k
6and the state s.T h e t h i r d t e r m , β
P
a∈A Vi(s0)g(s0|s,a)σ(a|s), is the expected discounted continuation
value.








The choice­speciﬁc value function is the expected utility that the agent received from taking the action ai




k is chosen,s)σi(ai = k|s).
2.2 Choice Probabilities and Choice­Speciﬁc Value Functions.
Arguing as in Rust (1994), it is straightforward to show that the equilibrium in our model must satisfy:
δi(s,²i)=k if and only if Vi(k,s)+²i(k) >V i(k0,s)+²i(k0) for all k0 6= k. (8)
The choice­speciﬁc value function is useful since it allows us to characterize the optimal decision rule in
our fully dynamic model in an analogous way as in a static discrete choice model. That is, action k is
chosen if and only if the choice­speciﬁc value function and error term associated with k is greater than the
analogous values for k0 6= k.
An implication of (8) is that the equilibrium choice probabilities σi(a|s) must satisfy:
σi(ai|s)=P r{²i(ai)+Vi(ai,s)− Vi(0,s) >² i(k)+Vi(k,s) − Vi(0,s),∀k =0 ,...,K,k6= ai} (9)
Equation(9)isasimpleconsequence of (8). Theequilibrium probabilitythatactionai is chosen is precisely
the probability that inequality (8) holds. Since the inequalities (8) depend only on the differences between
the choice­speciﬁc value functions, we can subtract Vi(0,s) from both sides.





k=0 exp(Vi(k,s) − Vi(0,s))
(10)
Akey insightemphasizedbyHotzandMiller(1993)isthatequation(10)impliesthatthe equilibrium choice
probabilities, σi(ai|s), have a one­to­one relationship to the choice­speciﬁc value functions, Vi(ai,s) −





= Vi(k,s) − Vi(k0,s)
7This equation is central is the estimation algorithms proposed by Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002) and Pe­
sendorfer and Schmidt­Dengler (2003). It will also play a crucial role in the algorithm that we discuss
below.
The one­to­one mapping between choice probabilities and choice­speciﬁc value functions holds more
generally than in just the simple case of the logit model. Evidently, the mapping holds whenever the
distribution of ²i has full support. We let Γ : {0,...,K}×S → [0,1] denote the map in general from
choice­speciﬁc value functions to choice probabilities, i.e.
(σi(0|s),...,σi(K|s)) = Γ(Vi(1,s)− Vi(0,s),...V i(K,s) − Vi(0,s))
We will denote the inverse mapping by Ω:
(Vi(1,s) − Vi(0,s),...V i(K,s) − Vi(0,s)) = Ωi(σi(0|s),...,σi(K|s)). (11)
2.3 Outline of Estimation Strategy.
Estimation proceeds in four steps. In the ﬁrst step, the economist estimates σi(k|s) exibly using a sieve
estimation strategy. In the second step, the economist evaluates equation (11) using the estimated choice
probabilities. This generates an estimate of the choice­speciﬁc value functions that is consistent with the
observed choices in the data. In the third step, given a guess θ of the true value of the utility parameters,
θ0, the economist evaluates equations similar to (7). This generates choice­speciﬁc value functions that are
consistent with θ. In the fourth step, the economist then minimizesthe distance betweenthe choice­speciﬁc
value functions found in the second and third steps. We will describe the estimator in detail in what follows
below.
2.3.1 First Step: Estimation of Choice Probabilities.
Suppose that the economist has access to time series data on t =1 ,...,T repetitions of the dynamic game.
During each time period, the economist observes the actions and state variables for each agent (ai,t,s i,t).
In the ﬁr s ts t e pw ef o r ma ne s t i m a t eb σi(k|s) of σi(k|s) using sieve series expansions (Ai and Chen (2003)).
Let s =( sd,s c) denote the discrete and continuous components of s.A l s o l e t #d and #c denote the
dimension of sd and sc.
Let {ql(sc),l=1 ,2,...} denote a sequence of known basis functions that can approximate a realvalued
measurable function of sc arbitrarily well for a sufﬁciently large value of l. The sieve could be formed
using splines, Fourier Series or orthogonal polynomials (see Chen (2005) for a survey of sieve estimation).
8We let the basis become increasingly exible as T becomes large. Let κ(T) denote the number of basis
functions to be used when the sample size is T. We shall assume that κ(T) →∞ , κ(T)/T → 0 at an
appropriate rate to be speciﬁed below. Denote the 1 × κ(T) vector of basis functions as
qκ(T)(sc)=( q1(sc),...,q κ(T)(sc)), (12)






The number of elements in this vector is κ(T) times the number of time periods T times the number of
discretevaluesthatsd can assume times κ(T). The indicator function 1(sd
t = sd)isequaltoone ifthevalue
of the discrete state in the data is equal to sd and zero otherwise. Thus, the vector QT(sd) is comprised
of the individual qκ(T)(sc
t) for t =1 ,...,T in those periods when the state is sd and a zero vector of length
κ(T) in periods t when sd
t 6= sd.







Equation (13) is the standard formula for a linear probability model where the regressors are the sieve func­
tions κ(T) in equation (12). The sieve estimator b σi(k|s) will converge to the true σi(k|s) at a nonparamet­
ric rate which is slower than
√
T. This results in no loss of generality as long as we deﬁne the sieve basis
functions properly to include dummy variables that indicate the discrete state variables. In what follows, we
shall assume for the ease of exposition that s = sc. Since there are a ﬁnite number of discrete states, our
rate of convergence and asymptotic theory will be unaffected in the more general case where s =( sc,s d).
Other link functions could also be used. For example, we could estimate a sieve logit model in the ﬁrst step.
The asymptotic theory is notationally simpler for the case of a sieve linear probability model. However, a
similar strategy could be used to establish our asymptotic results for alternative estimators in the ﬁrst step.
The ﬁrst step estimator implicitly abstracts away from problems that might be caused by the multiplicity
of equilibrium. If our data consists of a time series for a ﬁxed set of agents, multiplicity is not an issue.
However, in many standard applications in empirical industrial organization the data are pooled across
markets(see,for example,theentrymodelsof BresnahanandReiss(1991,1992), Berry(1992)andCiliberto
andTamer(2005)). Sinceitislikelythatdifferentmarketsmaybeindifferentequilibria, lack of uniqueness
could be an issue. In this case, it is not possible even in principal to recover a single rule σi(k|s) that
describes behavior in all markets.
9Inpractice, therearetwopotentialsolutionstothemultiplicityproblem. Theﬁrstistouseestimatorsthat
explicitlyaccommodatemultiplicityasinBjornandVuong(1984), BresnahanandReiss(1990,1991), Berry
(1992), Moro (2003), Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran (2002), Tamer (2002), Sweeting (2004), Ciliberto and
Tamer (2005) or Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2005). Unfortunately, many of these estimators either require the
econometrician to be able to analytically characterize certain properties of the equilibrium or to compute
the entire equilibrium set. These strategies do not generalize to the class of dynamic models that we are
considering.
The second approach to dealing with multiplicity is to assume uniqueness. This is a strong assumption,
as even single agent problems can generate multiple solutions. Typically, very strong strict convexity and
concavity assumptions are required for uniqueness in many single agent models. The results of Komunjer
and Echenique (2005) suggest that many standard regressions, ranging from estimates of production func­
tions to the returns from education are highly problematic if multiplicity is present. The basic idea is that
the observed endogenous variables are determined by how the equilibrium is selected given a ﬁxed set of
primitives. This sourceof uncertaintyisrarelyaccountedfor ineither econometric theoryor applied econo­
metrics. While the uniqueness assumption is potentially strong, we note that it is made implicitly in many
applications. We shall make this assumption in what follows, but not that accounting for multiplicity im­
portant topic for future research.
2.3.2 Second Step: Inversion.
In our second step, we take as given our estimates b σi(k|s) of the equilibrium choice probabilities. We
then form an estimate of the choice­speciﬁc value functions, ˆ Vi(k,st) − ˆ Vi(0,s t) for k =1 ,...,K and
t =1 ,...,T. This can be done by evaluating (11) using b σi(k|s) in place of σi(k|s).T h a t i s :
³
b Vi(1,s t) − b Vi(0,s t),...b Vi(K,st) − b Vi(0,s t)
´
= Φi (b σi(0|st),...,b σi(K|st))
In the speciﬁc case of the logit model, this inversion would simply be:
ˆ Vi(k,st) − ˆ Vi(0,s t)=l o g( b σi(k|st)) − log(b σi(0|st)) (14)
In an alternative model, such as one with normal shocks, we would need to solve a nonlinear system.
In our second step, we will also want to compute b E(²i(ai)|ai is chosen,st) for all i and all t. T h i si sa n
estimate of the expected value of the error term conditional on the action and the observed value of the state
variable. Fix i and st and draw r =1 ,...,Rsimulated values of ²
(r)
i of the stochastic preference shocks.
10Since the distribution of the preference shocks is known, this can easily be done. Equation (9) implies that





i ) if and only if ²
(r)
i (ai)+b Vi(ai,s) − b Vi(0,s) >
²
(r)
i (k)+b Vi(k,s)− b Vi(0,s),∀k =0 ,...,K, k6= ai.






i ), we can estimate b E(²i(ai)|ai is chosen,st).I n
principal, such a simulations could introduce error into our estimator. However, we will assume that the
investigator has access to a sufﬁcientlypowerful computer to simulate the objects sothat thissource of error
can be effectively ignored.
2.3.3 Third Step: Computation of Choice­Speciﬁc Value Function.
In the third step, we ﬁnd choice­speciﬁc value functions that are consistent with a particular value of θ.I n












In equation (15), Λi(s) is the expected value of the error term after we have marginalized out player i’s
action ai. The function Φi(s) is the expected value of the basis functions after we have marginalized out
the actions of all players. Equations (17) and (18) has the same recursive structure as a Bellman’s equation.





The term EΦi(s0|s) is deﬁned similarly.
Let V ∗
i (ai,s;θ) denote the choice­speciﬁc value function. Using standard arguments in dynamic pro­
11gramming (see Rust (1994)), it can easily be shown that:
V ∗
i (ai,s;θ)=Φi(ai,s)0θ + βe Λi(ai,s)+βe Φi(ai,s)0θ, (20)
where Φi(ai,s)=ˆ E [Φi(ai,a −i,s)|ai,s] (21)





In equations (21)­(23) ˆ E will denote a consistent “estimate” of the objects in parentheses. For instance,
e Λi(ai,s) will denote an estimate of ¯ Λi(s0) given that the current action is ai and the state is equal to s.
Equation (20) says that the choice­speciﬁc value function is equal to the sum of three terms. The ﬁrst term,
Φi(ai,s)0θ is the expected value of Φi(ai,a −i,s) given that player i’s action is ai and the state is s. The
second term, βe Λi(ai,s) is the expected continuation value of future values of the error term in equation
(17) given that the current choice is ai. The ﬁnal term, βe Φi(ai,s)0θ, is the expected discounted value of the
deterministic part of utility, given that the current choice is ai.
We wish to avoid the computational burden of simulating objects similar to (19) or using a contraction
mapping to directly solve equations (17)­(18). Therefore, we will use a sieve estimator to estimate the right
hand sides of (21)­(23). For example, to estimate the right hand side of (23) we regress ¯ Λi(st+1) on ¯ Λi(st)
conditional on the fact that the action at time t is ai.T h e ﬁtted value of the regression is our consistent
estimate of the right hand sides of (23).
Let QT(ai) be formed in a similar way to QT in step one, except that only observations in which the
choice of agent i is equal to ai are used. Instead of having T rows, QT(ai) only has number of rows equal



























Given the above equations, value function iteration is not required to solve for Λi(st) or Φi(st) for
12t =1 ,...,T. To see why, substituting (24) into equation (17) yields to following system:







Suppose that we estimate Λi(st) by simulating (15). Substitute this simulation estimate b Λi(st) of Λi(st)
into the above to yield:


























It is straightforward to demonstrate that the T by T matrix AT is invertible and ¯ Λi(st) can be solved for
uniquely. 3 By analogous arguments, Φi(st), t =1 ,...,T can be computed as the solution to a linear
system.
Since both (17) and (18) can be solved as a linear system, it follows that V ∗
i (st;θ)=Λi(st)+Φi(st)0θ
for t =1 ,...,T can be solved for as a linear function of θ. W en o t et h a tn e i t h e rΛi(st) nor Φi(st) depend
on θ. Thus, while it may initially take some effort to compute these objects, once these 2T scalars are
computed, we never need to compute them again in order to solve for V ∗
i (st;θ)!
We note that other strategies are possible for ﬁnding the expected choice­speciﬁc value functions. For
instance, one could simulate continuation values as in Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2003) in order to avoid
t h en e e dt oi n v e r tt h eT ×T matrix. In samples with many observations, this may be a preferable procedure
since less memory is required.
2.3.4 Final Step: Minimization.
The ﬁnal step that we perform is to ﬁnd a value of θ which minimizes the distance between the choice­
speciﬁc value functions found in the second and third steps. As before we will use ˆ VT(s) to denote the
vector of functions recovered from inverting the vector of conditional choice probabilities, for each s:
b VT(s)=
h
ˆ Vi(k,s) − ˆ Vi(0,s),, k =1 ,...,K,i=1 ,...,n
i
, (27)
3 Ifweexaminethecoefﬁcientmatrixon ¯ Λi(st),t=1 ,...,T, we will easilysee that it is a nonsingular and invertible matrix.
Alternatively, we can use an iterative procedure to solve for ¯ Λi(st) for all t. It is not difﬁcult to see that for
each T,t h i sd e ﬁnes a contraction mapping in the integrated square norm 1/T
PT
t=1 ¯ Λi(st), so that the value
function iteration procedure will converge to a unique ﬁxed point.
13and let ˜ Λ∗




˜ Λi(k,s) − ˜ Λi(0,s),k=1 ,...,K,i=1 ,...,n
i
.












Let A(s) be a dim(θ) × (n × K) dimension matrix of instruments which is sufﬁc i e n t l yr i c ht oi d e n t i f yθ.
W ec a nt h e nd e ﬁne our parameter estimate as:
































The theory of sieve approximation provides rigorous conditions for controlling the bias term from the fact
that the ﬁrst stage is approximated using a ﬁnite number of basis functions. It turns out, as we shall
rigorously justify in the next sections, that the statistical properties of our estimator can be performed as
if the ﬁrst stage was estimated parametrically. In this section we describe in details how one can perform
practical inference to obtain a consistent estimate of the conﬁdence intervals and standard errors. In the
next section, we will discuss the formal theory of semiparametric variances and the required regularity
conditions.
In equation (29), a simple approach would be to deﬁne our instruments as A(st)=ˆ Φ∗
T(st). This would






ˆ VT(st) − ˆ Λ∗(st) − ˆ Φ∗
T(st)0θ
i0 h




This is equivalent to choosing the instrument matrix A(st)=ˆ Φ∗



















ˆ VT(st) − ˆ Λ∗(st)
i
. (30)
14In practice, it is possible to use bootstrap or other resampling schemes to obtain consistent standard errors.
When T is small, the value function iteration step can be solved by just inverting a T × T matrix, the
computation cost of repeatedly computing ˆ θ should not be overly demanding.
In what follows, we describe a method for computing standard errors that does not require resampling.
This can potentially save computational time if T is large and difﬁcult to store in the memory of the re­






























ˆ θ − θ0
´
can be consistently estimated by ˆ G−1
T ˆ ΩT ˆ G−10
























To obtain ˆ ΩT we examine the structure of `(θ0).L e t VT(st), Λ∗(st) and Φ∗
T(st) denote the population
analog of ˆ VT(st), ˆ Λ∗(st) and ˆ Φ∗
T(st). First we note that
VT(st)− Λ∗(st) − Φ∗
T(st)0θ0 ≡ 0

















The estimation uncertainty in `(θ0) all comes from the ﬁrst stage estimation errors in estimating ˆ VT(st),
ˆ Λ∗
T(st) and ˆ Φ∗
T(st). To describe this, we will use ˆ ΨT(st)− Ψ(st) to denote any one of the elements of
h





In a parametric setup for the ﬁrst stage where the parametric functional form is assumed to be correctly
speciﬁed, ˆ ΨT(st) − Ψ(st) depends on a set of least squares regression coefﬁcients α, such that Ψ∗
T(st)=
Ψ∗
T(st;α0),a n dˆ Ψ∗
T(st)=ˆ Ψ∗
T(st, ˆ α). Each component of `(θ0) is then approximately distributed as
ˆ WT
√
T (ˆ α − α0)+op(1).











can be evaluated by numerical derivatives (The appendix gives more details about computing ˆ WT).T h e
variance of
√
T(ˆ θ−θ0)can then be estimated by ˆ G−1
T ˆ WT ˆ Σ ˆ W 0
T ˆ G−10
T ,w h e r eˆ Σ is an estimate of the variance
of
√
T(ˆ α − α0).S i n c eˆ α is just a set of least square regression coefﬁcients. ˆ Σ can easily be computed by
either bootstrapping, or Huber­White robust standard error type calculation. In the later case, let yt denote
the vector of the collection of dependent variables used in these linear regression, such as ¯ Λi(st+1) for all
i, and use et to denote the vector of residuals in these linear regressions. Then we can estimate














Naturally, one can also estimate Σ by the empirical variance covariance matrix of bootstrapped ˆ α. The next
question will be related to the efﬁcient choice of AT(st), the instrument matrix. We can choose AT(st) to
minimize the asymptotic variance of
√
























With a correctly speciﬁed parametric ﬁrst step α, it is not immediate to simplify the solution for the optimal
instruments AT(s), except in the case where s are all discrete, in which case AT(s) c a nb es o l v e db ya
system of linear equations. As we will see in the parametric case it is easier to obtain the optimal AT(s) in
the general case including continuous state variables s.
4 Semiparametric Variance
The estimator that we consider falls within the class of semiparametric estimators considered by Newey
(1994). He demonstratesthat, underappropriateregularityconditions, the secondstageasymptoticvariance
will be independent of the particular choice of nonparametric method used to estimate the ﬁrst stage (e.g.
sieveor kernel). This suggeststhatwecanderive the form of the semiparametric asymptotic variance ofour
estimatorthatisindependentofthenonparametric methodsthatareusedtoestimatethechoiceprobabilities.
Deriving this semiparametric variance is important because it validates the practical inference methods we
described in the previous section. The validity of these parametric inference methods depends on both the
knowledge of the limit semiparametric variances, and a set of regularity conditions that require the choice
probabilities and transition probabilities to be sufﬁciently smooth functions of the state variables.
16We are concerned with the asymptotic variance of the estimator deﬁned in (31), where the ﬁrst step
parametric estimation is considered to be a sieve approximation that expands as a function of the sample
size. Since ˆ Φ∗
T(st) consistently estimates Φ∗
T(st), it should be intuitively clear that the ﬁrst component of
the Jacobian term converges in probability: ˆ GT
p
−→ G,w h e r eG = E[A(st)Φ∗
T(st)]. If we can derive the














b VT(st) − ˆ Λ∗(st)− ˆ Φ∗
T(st)0θ
i









. In the above ˆ h is used to denote the set of
sieve least square projections that are used to estimate h, the set of conditional choice probabilities and
conditional transition processes given the state variables, that are used in forming
ˆ Ψ∗
T(st)=ˆ VT(st) − ˆ Λ∗(st) − ˆ Φ∗
T(st)0θ0.
For this purpose, the following proposition veriﬁes the linearization requirement in Newey (1994) for the
dynamic discrete model that we considered:
Proposition 1 There exists a set of linear functionals D(st,h) such that for any parametric sub­path h(θ)







and we can ﬁnd a set of functions δ(st) such that for all h:
ED(st,h)=Eδ(st)h(st).
The complete set of functions h, the linear functions D(z,h), and the set of inuence functions δ(z),a r e
given in the next section.
Based on the calculations that lead to this proposition, it then follows immediately from proposition 4 in
Newey (1994) that Ω = Va r(α(st)),w h e r eα(st)=δ(st)⊗(yt −h(st)),a n dyt is the vector of dependent
v a r i a b l e su s e di nt h eﬁrst stage linear regressions, and
h(st)=E(yt|st).





(yt − hα(st)) ⊗ qκ(T)(st),
17where hα(st) is the parametric approximation of h(st), in (32) we are effectively estimating α(st) by the
linear square projection of




¢−1 qκ(T)(st) ⊗ (yt − hα(st)).















therefore the ﬁrst part ˆ WT (Q0
TQT)
−1 qκ(T)(st) in ˆ α(st),b e i n gt h eﬁtted value of a least square projection
of δ(st) on qκ(T)(st), should be close to δ(st).
The veriﬁcation of the semiparametric asymptotic variance indicates that other approximations can be
used to estimate the asymptotic variance of ˆ θ. For example, a kernel based nonparametric regression or
other sieve basis functions can be used to consistentlyestimate h(st)and δ(st), which are feasibly given the
analytical forms of δ(st) derived in the appendix. They can be chosen based on computational tractability
and the plausibility of the results.
4.1 Semiparametric Inuence Functions
This subsection derives the linear asymptotic inuence functions D(st,h) and δ(st) that are used in propo­
sition 1. This subsection presumes familiarity with the arguments in Newey (1994) and can be skipped by
those readers interested in implementation issues and not the proof of proposition 1. We will denote the






where each set of hj(st) corresponds to a step in the nonparametric estimations before the last stage of
ﬁtting the parametric utility functions.
The inuence function h1(st) The function h1(st) corresponds to the estimation of ˆ σi(k|s) in (14).
Since the functions ˆ σi(k|s) enter the calculations of ˆ VT(st) through (14) and ˆ Λ∗
T(st) through (15), (17),
(23) and (27). Hence in correspondence to ˆ VT(st) and ˆ Λ∗
T(st) we can separate
D(st,h 1)=D1(st,h 1)+D2(st,h 1).
Deﬁne
∂Φ(σ)
∂σ (st) to be the (K × n) by (K) × n block diagonal derivative matrix of ˆ VT(st) with respect to
all σi(k|st) of equation (14), and deﬁne ˆ σ(st) to be the K × n vector of the collections of all ˆ σi(k|st) for









(st)(at − ˆ σ(st))
with δ(st)=A(st)
∂Φ(σ)
∂σ (st) and at is the stacked vector of ait for all i =1 ,...,n.
Next deﬁne
∂Λ(σ)
∂σ (st) to be the n by K × n derivative of (15). Note that
∂Λ(σ)
∂σ (st), (17), (23) and (27)
deﬁne a (system of) linear functional from σ(st) to ˆ Λ∗




The linear inuence function for D2(st,h 1) will be derived below.
The inuence functionh2(st) The inuence function h2(st) corresponds to the conditionalexpectation
operator in (17) and (18) that are used to compute the ﬁxed point functions ¯ Λi(s) and ¯ Φi(s). The transfor­
mations in (17) and (18) are nonlinear but can be linearized as follows. Let Ψ to denote generically either
Λ or Φ. We can replace (17) and (18) by












This deﬁnes a linear mapping from ˆ E(Ψ0
i(s0)|s) to ¯ Ψi(s). Together (33) and (23) and (22) deﬁne a linear
mapping from ˆ E(Ψ0
i(s0)|s) to ˆ Ψ∗
T(s), which was stacked in a vector ˜ Ψi(ai,s). Denote this linear transfor­










Its corresponding linear inuence function is also discussed below.
The inuence functionh3(st) The inuence function h3(st)corresponds to the conditionalexpectation
operator in (22) and (23) that are used to compute the choice­speciﬁc expectations. Since these are already
linear transformations.
D(st,h 3)=A(st) ˆ E[Ψ0(s0)|st,a i],
and the corresponding linear inuence function is therefore
A(st)
³
Ψ0(st+1)− ˆ E[Ψ0(s0)|st,a i]
´
where δ(st)=A(st).
19The inuence function h4(st) The inuence function h4(st) corresponds to the estimation of
ˆ Ea−i [Φi(ai,a −i,s)|ai,s]
in (21). This enters the calculation of ˆ Φ∗
T(st) directly through its ﬁrst terms in (28). by (21), and also
through the second term in (28) through both (21) the value function iterations (22). Therefore we can
correspondingly partition
D(st,h 4)=D1(st,h 4)+D2(st,h 4),
Obviously, the ﬁrst component can be written as
D1(st,h 4)=A(st)Ea−t [Φ(at,a −t,s t)|at,s t],
where Ea−t [Φ(at,a −t,s t)|at,s t] is the stacked vector of ˆ Ea−i [Φi(ai,a −i,s)|ait,s t].
For the second part D2(st,h 4), both (21) and (22) are linear transformations. They deﬁne a linear func­
tional from ˆ Ea−i [Φi(ai,a −i,s)|ai,s] to ˆ Φ∗
T(st), which we denote by ˆ Φ∗
T
³







ˆ Ea−i [Φi(ai,a −i,·)|ai,·]
´
(st).
The linear inuencefunctionsforD2(st,h 1), D(st,h 2),a n dD2(st,h 4). In the above we have explic­
itly given the asymptotic linear inuence function representations for D1(st,h 1), D(st,h 3) and D1(st,h 4).
We are now left to specify the linear inuence functions that correspond to D2(st,h 1), D(st,h 2),a n d
D2(st,h 4).T h e s ei n uence functions have a common structure which we exploit now. This common struc­
ture begins with a value function contraction mapping:
ˆ g(st)− βE [ˆ g(st+1)|st]=ˆ h(st).
In the second step the forward choice­speciﬁc conditional expectation of g(st) is computed and instru­
mented, so that we are concerned with the asymptotic representation of the moment conditions:
E [A(st)E [ˆ g(st+1)|at = k,st]].
For ease of exposition, we analyze an equivalent set of moment conditions:
E [A(st)p(ait = k|st)E[ˆ g(st+1)|ait = k,st]]
= E [A(st)E [1(ait = k|st)ˆ g(st+1)|st]] = E [A(st)1(ait = k|st)ˆ g(st+1)].
In the spirit of Newey (2004), we are looking for a set of functions δ(st) such that we can write





20To describe δ(st), ﬁrst we deﬁne the function
˜ A(st)=E [A(st−1)1(ait−1 = k)|st].
Then we can deﬁne δ(st) as the unique function solution to the following contraction mapping:
δ(st)− βE [δ(st−1)|st]= ˜ A(st). (35)
To see why this satisﬁes (34), note that we can write its left hand side as









because of stationarity. Now using the deﬁnition of δ(st),t h i s
can be written as
E [(δ(st) − βE [δ(st−1)|st]) ˆ g(st)] = Eδ(st)ˆ g(st) − βEδ(st−1)ˆ g(st)
= Eδ(st)ˆ g(st) − βEδ(st)ˆ g(st+1)=Eδ(st)[ˆ g(st) − βE (ˆ g(st+1)|st)].
The deﬁnition of g(st) in (35) then veriﬁes that this is equal to Eδ(st)ˆ h(st).W i t ht h i sd e ﬁnition of δ(st),
we can then write the asymptotic linear representation as
δ(st)(yt − h(st))




i(st+1) for D(st,h 2),a n dΦi(ait,a −it,s t) in D(st,h 4).
Thelinearityrepresentationfunctionsalsoallowustoaddressthe issueofefﬁcientchoiceofinstruments.
In general as we show above δ(st) is a linear functional of the instrument functions A(st), which we denote
δ[A(·)](st).A l s ol e tΣ(st)=Var(yt − h(st)|st) denote the conditional variance matrix of the dependent
variables in the conditional expecation calculations. Then we can in general write the asymptotic variance














Alternatively, we can also choose δ(st) efﬁciently, noting in turn that A(st) can be written as a linear
functionalofδ(st)byinvertingthemappingfrom A(st)toδ(st). Itisstraightforwardbuttedioustodescribe
the explicit functional form of A(st), because δ[A(·)](st) involves both a simple pointwise derivative and a
value function iteration. We omit such details.
214.2 Regularity conditions
Newey (1994) provided a set of sufﬁcient conditions that rigorously justify the validity of semiparametric
variances and the validity of the use of seive parametric models to approximate the limiting semiparametric
variance. We verify these regularity conditions for the dynamic model that we study.
The required regularity conditions can be broadly classiﬁed into two categories. The ﬁrst category con­
tains conditions on the sieve functions used and the degree of smoothness of the underlying function that
is estimated nonparametrically, so that the conditional expectations can be estimated at a sufﬁciently fast
rate of convergence. The second category of regularity conditions requires that the second stage semipara­
metric parameter is a sufﬁciently smooth functional of the conditional expectation functions that are being
estimated nonparametrically in the ﬁrst stage.
Assumption 1. For each of the h(s)=hj(s) conditional expectation function that is being estimated
nonparametrically in the ﬁrst stage,
sup
s∈
|h(s) − hκ(s)| ≤ Cκ−α
where hκ(s)=qκ(s)0 (Eqκ(s)qκ(s)0)
−1 Eqκ(s)h(s). The class of sieve approximating functions









where ζ0(κ)=s u p z∈ ||qκ(s)||.
This assumption implies that the ﬁrst stage nonparametric estimation converges to the truth at a rate
faster than T1/4 because Newey (1994b) showed that under this assumption:
sup
z∈






















T → 0, E (δ(s) − δκ(s))
2 → 0,a n d
ζ0(κ)2E (h(s) − hκ(s))
2 −→ 0.












δ(st)(yt − h(zt)) +op(1).
Note that both of these two assumptions apply generically to similar two step semiparametric models.
Once we made these two assumptions, there is no need to verify them for our model. In contrast, the next
22two assumptions stated below will need to be veriﬁed for the model we consider. The contraction mapping









−→ 0,a n df o re a c hh = hj, D(st,h) satisﬁes
|D(st,h) − D(st,h 0)| ≤ b(st)sup
s
|h(s) − h0(s)|. where Eb(st)2 < ∞.
The ﬁrst part of this assumption is a condition on the sieve functions and is not model speciﬁc. In our
model, the second part of the above assumption is satisﬁed as long as the instrument matrix A(st) has ﬁnite
variance, because of the contraction mapping property. Note that in our modelD(st,h−h0) typically takes
the form of
A(st)(g(st) − g0(st)) ≤ A(st)sup
s
|g(s) − g0(s)|,
where (g(s) − g0(s)) is deﬁned as the unique ﬁxed point solution to the functional iteration:











Hence this assumption is satisﬁed.
The last assumption requires that the sample moment condition used in our estimation procedure is ap­
proximated well enough by the D(s,h) that are linear functionals of the ﬁrst stage conditional expectations
h = hj for all j’s.
Assumption 4. For each h = hj,
√
T sups |m(s,h)− m(s,h0) − D(s,h − h0)| = op(1).
To see why this assumption is satisﬁed in our model, note that m(st,h) typically takes the form of
A(st)ˆ g(st),w h e r eˆ g(st) is the solution to the sample value function iteration:











On the other hand, D(s,h) takes the form of A(st)¯ g(st),w h e r e¯ g(s) solves the following iteration:












¯ g(s0) − g0(s0)|s
¢
.
23T h ed i f f e r e n c eb e t w e e nm(s,h) and D(s,h) hence is driven by the difference ˆ g(s) − ¯ g(s), which can be
written as
ˆ g(s) − ¯ g(s)=β
³










¯ g(s0) − g0(s0)|s
¢´
.




¯ ¯ ˆ E
¡

















β ˆ E(ˆ g(s0) − ¯ g(s0)|s) ≤ (β + op(1))E(ˆ g(s0)− ¯ g(s0)|s).
By combining these, we have therefore shown that
(1 − β + op(1))sup
s
√









Hence the last required assumption is veriﬁed because of assumption 1 and the above properties of our
model.
5 Nonparametric Identiﬁcation and Alternative Estimators
In the previous sections, we have assumed that the period utility function has a parametric representation
Πi(a,s;θ). Identiﬁcation in the estimator Section 2 formally required a sufﬁciently rich set of instruments.
In this section, we discuss the problem of identifying the period return function if parametric assumptions
are not imposed. Our identiﬁcation strategy will suggest an alternative set of estimators which we will
briey discuss at the end of this section. Identiﬁcation of models with discrete state spaces has been dis­
cussed by Hotz and Miller (1993), Berry, Pakes, and Ostrovsky (2003), Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002)
and Pesendorfer and Schmidt­Dengler (2003). Recent work by Heckman and Navarro (2005) and Aguirre­
gabiria (2005) discuss identiﬁcation in models with continuous state variables. The arguments we present
here are closely related to the ideas of Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2004) and Bajari and Krainer (2004) which
propose exclusion restrictions to identify static games.
Formally, we consider the problem of recovering the function Πi(ai,a −i,s) without specifying it para­
metrically as Πi(ai,a −i,s;θ). We begin by assuming that the econometrician has knowledge of the distri­
bution of the ²i. As we discussed in Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2004), this assumption is required for identi­
ﬁcation even in a static model. The intuition is straightforward. For instance, a textbook binary probit is a
24special case ofourdynamic model where β =0 , there are twochoicesandtheerrortermisnormallydistrib­
uted. We can think of s as the set of covariates. Let σ1(a1 =0 |s) be the probability thatthe choice is equal
to one in the probit. Then we can rationalize this probability by setting Π1(a1,s)=F−1(σ1(a1 =0 |s))
where F is the normal c.d.f. Obviously, if knowledge of the distribution of the error term is required for a
static, single agent problem, it must be required for our model that nests this as an extremely special case.
Furthermore, we assume that the economist has knowledge of the discount factor, β. Rust (1994) discusses
why this is not identiﬁed even in single agent discrete choice problems.






Inthesecondstep, weaskwhatrestrictions,suchasexclusionrestrictions, canbeusedtoidentifyΠi(ai,a −i,s)
from knowledge of Πi(ai,s).
5.1 Identiﬁcation of Πi(ai,s)
Identiﬁcationoftheﬁrst step of Πi(ai,s)followsfromargumentsalongthe linesof Aguirregabiria andMira
(2002) and Magnac and Thesmar (2002). The basic idea is quite simple. The deﬁnition of equilibrium
implies that an agent makes a best response to his equilibrium expectations about the actions of the other
agents. By focusing on (36), we are identifying an agent’s period utility in equilibrium from choosing an
action ai. This is similar to identifying the structural parameters in a single agent problem:

































25Next, we impose the normalization that Πi(0,a −i,s)=0for all a−i. This is similar to the assumption
thatthere is an outside goodin a single agentdiscrete choice model. Inan entry model, if 0 corresponded to
the decision not to enter a market, then this assumption could be interpreted as the proﬁt from not entering
a market being zero. Since this assumption is required for identiﬁcation in much simpler static models
(see Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2004) for a formal argument), it is not surprising that it is also required for










(Vi(k,s0) − Vi(0,s 0))σi(k|s0)|s,0
#
. (38)
Based on arguments similar to Section 2, it is clear that the right hand side can be recovered from the
population. The left hand side obviously satisﬁes Blackwell’s sufﬁcient conditions and is a contraction that
c a nb eu s e dt or e c o v e rVi(0,s) uniquely. Therefore Vi(0,s) is identiﬁed. In section 2, we established that
there is aninversionbetweenchoice probabilitiesand Vi(k,s)−Vi(0,s)for k =1 ,...,K. Givenknowledge
of Vi(0,s), we can clearly recover Vi(k,s). Thus, our choice­speciﬁc value functions are identiﬁed.
Once these quantities are known, Πi(ai,s) c a nt h e nb ei d e n t i ﬁed since all of the terms on the right hand









5.2 Identiﬁcation of Πi(ai,a −i,s)




σ−i(a−i|s)Πi(ai,a −i,s),∀i =1 ,...,n,a i =1 ,...,K. (40)
Even with the normalization that Πi(0,a −i,s) ≡ 0, it is clear that Πi(ai,a −i,s) is not identiﬁed. Holding
the state vector s ﬁxed, determining the utilities of all agents involves solving for n × K × (K +1 ) n−1
unknowns. That is, there are n agents, for each action k =1 ,...,K, utility depends on the (K +1 ) n−1
possible actions of the other agents. However, the left hand side of (40) only contains information about
n × (K +1 )scalars holding s ﬁxed. It is clearly not possible to invert this system in order to identify
Πi(ai,a −i,s) for all i,a l lk =1 ,....,K and all a−i ∈ A−i. Related nonidentiﬁcation results have been
found by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991,1992) and Pesendorfer and Schmidt­Dengler (2003).
Obviously, there must be cross equation restrictions across either i or k in order to identify the system.
An obvious way to identify the system is to impose exclusion restrictions. Partition s =( si,s −i),a n d
26suppose Πi(ai,a −i,s)=Πi(ai,a −i,s i) depends only on the subvector si. An example of this might be
in an entry model. In this type of model the state is usually a vector of productivity shocks. While we
might expect the proﬁto fﬁrm i to depend on the entry decisions of other agents, it should not depend on
the productivity shocks of other agents. See Bajari and Krainer (2003) and Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2004)
for other examples of possible exclusion restrictions that can be used in applications. If such an exclusion
restriction is possible, we can then write
ˆ Πi(ai,s −i,s i)=
X
a−i
σ−i(a−i|s−i,s i)ˆ Πi(ai,a −i,s i).
Clearly, a sufﬁcient identiﬁcation condition is that for each si, there exists (K+1) n−1 points in the support
of the conditional distribution of s−i given si, such that this system of equations form by these (K +1) n−1
points given si is invertible. In other words, Let s1
−i,...,s
(K+1)n−1
−i denote these points, then identiﬁcation




−i,s i),a −i =1 ,...,(K +1 ) n−1,j=1 ,...,(K +1 ) n−1
i
be nonsingular and invertible. Note that this assumption will be satisﬁed as long as s−i contains a continu­
ously distributed variable with sufﬁcient variability.
Obviously, there must be cross equation restrictions across either i or k in order to identify the system.
An obvious way to identify the system is to impose exclusion restrictions. Partition s =( si,s −i),a n d
suppose Πi(ai,a −i,s)=Πi(ai,a −i,s i) depends only on the subvector si. An example of this might be
in an entry model. In empirical studies of entry, the proﬁto fﬁrm i is usually modeled as a function of
i’s entry decision and the entry decision of other ﬁrms. The productivity shocks of other ﬁrms −i are not
typically included in i’s proﬁts. However, the productivity shocks of other ﬁrms may inuence their own
entry decisions. Thus, these generate a set of variables that might be plausbily excluded from si but which
might enter s. Such exclusion restrictions are often difﬁcult to ﬁnd in practice and may be controversial.
However, they are required for identiﬁcation when simultaneity is present in many other settings. We next
characterize which exclusion restrictions are sufﬁcient for identiﬁcation in games as well.
Thetwo step identiﬁcation structure that we discuss above also suggests simple identiﬁcation conditions
for parametric utility models. Suppose we parameterize utilities as Πi(ai,a −i,s;θ) such that the normal­
ization constraint Π(0,a −i,s;θ) ≡ 0 at all values of θ. Since as in (40), the left hand side Πi(ai,s) and the
choice probabilities σ−i(a−i|s) are identiﬁed, parametric identiﬁcation can be stated as requiring that for







for some ai =1 ,...,Kand for a set of s with positive probabilities.
5.3 Alternative Semiparametric Estimators
The identiﬁcation procedure discussed above suggests an alternative approach to estimating the model that
doesnotrelyonthe linearityassumptionsthatwe imposesearlierinthe paper. Usingthenotationdeveloped
in the previous sections, we briey describe the steps involved in constructing this alternative estimator.
Step 1: Estimate choice probabilities as in step 1 in section 2.3.1.
Step 2: Estimate ˆ Vi(k,st)− ˆ Vi(0,s t)for k =1 ,...,K, i =1 ,...,nandt =1 ,...,Tthroughthe inversion
step described in section 2.3.2. As an immediate consequence, we can also estimate ˆ Λi(s), the expected
unobserved utilities conditional on optimal choice of the agents.
Step 3: Use the sample analog of (38) to obtain an estimate of ˆ Vi(0,s) for all i:
ˆ Vi(0,s)− β ˆ E[ˆ Vi(0,s 0)|s]=β ˆ E
h
ˆ Λi(s0)+ ˆ E
h





Consistent estimation of the expectation objects ˆ E in the above can be obtained by sieve based least
square regressions described in section 2.3.3. The value function iteration for ˆ Vi(0,s) on the left hand side
can be obtained by either recursive least square projection that iterates to convergence, or by inverting a
T × T m a t r i xa sd e s c r i b e di ns e c t i o n2 . 3 . 3 .
Step 4: Use equation (39) or (37) torecover a nonparametric estimate of the conditional expected per period
utility ˆ Πi(ai,s).






qκ(T)(sτ)Πi(aiτ,a −iτ,s τ;θ). (41)
Note that when Πi(ai,a −i;θ) is speciﬁed as a linear function of θ as in (2), we can estimate ˆ Πi(ai,s;θ) by







Step 6: Minimize a proper norm of the distance between the nonparametric estimate of ˆ Πi(ai,s) and the
semiparametric estimate of ˆ Πi(ai,s;θ) in the above step 4:
ˆ θ =m i n
θ
||ˆ Π(a,s) − ˆ Π(a,s;θ),∀i =1 ,...,n,∀ai =0 ,...,K||.
28where ˆ ΠT(s) and ˆ ΠT(s,θ) are the vectors of collections ˆ Πi(ai,s) and ˆ Πi(ai,s;θ) for all i =1 ,...,nand
ai =0 ,...,K. As before, we can use the sample weights to specify the norms and use smooth norms so
thatˆ θ isasymptoticallydeﬁned bythe solution to a set of momentconditions with a dim(θ)×(n×(K+1))







ˆ ΠT(st) − ˆ ΠT(st;θ)
i
.
For example, a semiparametric nonlinear least square estimator can be deﬁned as






ˆ ΠT(st) − ˆ ΠT(st;θ)
i2
.





In particular, with the linear in parameter speciﬁcation of the per period utility function, the estimator for ˆ θ














where ˆ ΦT(st) is the vector of ˆ Φi(ai,s t) constructed in (41).
Practical inference methods and the asymptotic distribution theory can be written similar to sections
3 and 4. Since they are completely analogous, we do not reproduce the results here. By choosing the
instrument matrix A(st) efﬁciently, we can also show that this estimator is as efﬁcient as the previous one
w es t u d i e di ns e c t i o n s2 ,3a n d4 .
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a semiparametric estimator for dynamic games of incomplete information.
The estimator is inuenced by earlier work by Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2003), Aguirregabiria and Mira
(2002), Pesendorfer and Schmidt­Dengler (2003) and Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2003). However, unlike
the earlier literature, the econometric approach that we take exploits the modern theory of semiparametric
estimation, particularly sieve estimation (see Ai and Chen (2003) and Chen (2005)) and the theoretical
results of Newey (1994). Therefore, we are able to estimate models that allow for a nonparametric ﬁrst
step and continuous state variables. Also, our results clarify the identiﬁcation of these models for the
29case of continuous state variables. In general these models are underidentiﬁed, however, with appropriate
restrictions on payoffs, identiﬁcation is possible.
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